

Bogons Observatory

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Bogon Prefixes - Definition

- **Martians** are private and reserved addresses defined by RFCs
- **Traditional bogons** include martians and prefixes that have not been allocated to a regional internet registry (RIR) by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
- **Fullbogons** contain the traditional bogon prefixes, but also include the IP space allocated to the RIRs, but not yet assigned by them to Local Internet Registries (LIRs), **for both IPv4 and IPv6** [1]

IPv4 Martians

- **0.0.0.0/8** # RFC 791 & 1122 "This network"
- **10.0.0.0/8** # RFC 1918 Private-Use
- **100.64.0.0/10** # RFC 6598 Shared Address Space
- **127.0.0.0/8** # RFC 1122 Loopback
- **169.254.0.0/16** # RFC 3927 Link Local
- **172.16.0.0/12** # RFC 1918 Private-Use
- **192.0.2.0/24** # RFC 5737 Documentation (TEST-NET-1)
- **192.88.99.0/24** # RFC 7526 Deprecated (6to4 Relay Anycast)
- **192.168.0.0/16** # RFC 1918 Private-Use
- **198.18.0.0/16** # RFC 2544 Benchmarking
- **198.51.100.0/24** # RFC 5737 Documentation (TEST-NET-2)
- **203.0.113.0/24** # RFC 5737 Documentation (TEST-NET-3)
- **240.0.0.0/4** # RFC 1112 Reserved

Sources: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml>
<https://bgpfilterguide.nlnog.net/>

IPv6 Martians

- **::/8** # RFC 3513 and RFC 4291 IPv4-compatible, loopback, et al
- **0100::/64** # RFC 6666 Discard-Only
- **2001:2::/48** # RFC 5180 BMWG
- **2001:10::/28** # RFC 4843 ORCHID
- **2001:db8::/32** # RFC 3849 documentation
- **2002::/16** # RFC 7526 6to4 anycast relay
- **ffe::/16** # RFC 3701 old 6bone
- **fc00::/7** # RFC 4193 unique local unicast
- **fe80::/10** # RFC 4291 link local unicast
- **fec0::/10** # RFC 3879 old site local unicast
- **ff00::/8** # RFC 4291 multicast

Sources: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-address-space/ipv6-address-space.xhtml>
<https://bgpfilterguide.nlnog.net/>

Bogon **ASNs** - Definition

- Similarly to prefixes, an ASN should be termed as Bogon **if any of the following conditions is true** [3]
 - It is reserved for special use by an RFC
 - It is not part of the block assigned to a RIR by IANA
 - It is not assigned to a LIR by any RIR

Reserved and Unallocated ASNs

- 0 # RFC 7607
- 23456 # RFC 6793 AS_TRANS
- 64496 - 64511 # RFC 5398 and documentation/example ASNs
- 64512 - 65534 # RFC 6996 Private ASNs
- 65535 # RFC 7300 Last 16 bit ASN
- 65536 - 65551 # RFC 5398 and documentation/example ASNs
- 65552 - 131071 # IANA reserved ASNs
- 151866 - 196607 # Unallocated
- 213404 - 262143 # Unallocated
- 273821 - 327679 # Unallocated
- 329728 - 393215 # Unallocated
- 401309 - 4199999999 # Unallocated
- 4200000000 - 4294967294 # RFC 6996 Private ASNs
- 4294967295 # RFC 7300 Last 32 bit ASN

Source: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/as-numbers.xhtml>

Why we care about Bogons?

- They are usually the result of configuration mistakes
- However, they are also commonly found as the source for various types of misconduct
 - source addresses of DDoS attacks
 - BGP security events, such as hijacks and route leaks
 - other types of nefarious Internet activity

Code BGP Monitor

BGP Monitoring Service developed by Code BGP


- Routing daemon: Bird 2
- Route Reflection ([RFC 4456](#))
- BGP Add-Path ([RFC 7911](#))
- 218 full feed peerings (v4 & v6)
- 72 cities, 44 countries, 23 upstreams





The Code BGP Platform is configured to monitor

- Fullbogon prefixes (IPv4 and IPv6)
- Bogon ASNs present in AS Paths



Methodology

- RIPE NCC publishes daily a CSV file (~683k lines) which contains the prefixes and ASNs that have been assigned to LIRs, based on data gathered from all five RIRs (**creds to Max Stucci** for the info)
- A script checks every hour and downloads this file, identifies all the entries that are either “available” or “reserved”, and creates two lists
 - Bogon prefixes
 - Bogon ASNs
- These two lists are used to update the Bird BGP filters of the Code BGP Monitor Route Collectors
- The Bogon ASNs and prefixes are forwarded to the Code BGP Platform via BGP

CSV: <https://ftp.ripe.net/pub/stats/ripenncc/nro-stats/latest/nro-delegated-stats>

2234	ripenncc	DE	asn	2777	1	19930823	assigned	5b92e74d-908f-4643-b09c-91164f9454dd	e-stats
2235	ripenncc	DE	asn	2778	1	19930823	assigned	5b92e74d-908f-4643-b09c-91164f9454dd	e-stats
2236	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2779	1	20230411	reserved	ripenncc	e-stats
2237	ripenncc	DE	asn	2780	1	19930823	assigned	5b92e74d-908f-4643-b09c-91164f9454dd	e-stats
2238	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2781	1	20230411	reserved	ripenncc	e-stats
2239	ripenncc	DE	asn	2782	1	19930823	assigned	5b92e74d-908f-4643-b09c-91164f9454dd	e-stats
2240	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2783	1	20230411	reserved	ripenncc	e-stats
2241	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2784	1	20230411	reserved	ripenncc	e-stats
2242	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2785	1	20230411	reserved	ripenncc	e-stats
2243	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2786	1	20230411	reserved	ripenncc	e-stats
2244	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2787	1	20230411	reserved	ripenncc	e-stats
2245	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2788	1	20230411	reserved	ripenncc	e-stats
2246	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2789	1	20230411	reserved	ripenncc	e-stats
2247	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2790	1	20230411	reserved	ripenncc	e-stats
2248	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2791	1	20230411	reserved	ripenncc	e-stats
2249	ripenncc	DE	asn	2792	1	19930823	assigned	5b92e74d-908f-4643-b09c-91164f9454dd	e-stats
2250	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2793	1	20230411	available	ripenncc	e-stats
2251	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2794	1	20230411	available	ripenncc	e-stats
2252	ripenncc	ZZ	asn	2795	1	20230411	available	ripenncc	e-stats

Example of reserved and available ASNs


```

290779 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.238.0|256|19930125|assigned|1e7e8b26a7f57161a42d988f6c1ab824|e-stats
290780 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.239.0|256|19930125|assigned|29c22955e3ec738701505c5cac58369e|e-stats
290781 apnic|ZZ|ipv4|198.17.240.0|512|20230411|available|apnic|e-stats
290782 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.242.0|256|19930125|assigned|bb474b75b6f23182ffa56daf1cf9ec23|e-stats
290783 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.243.0|256|19960104|assigned|9f14454567a6c23e60bfd4fec24d1438|e-stats
290784 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.244.0|256|19960104|assigned|9f14454567a6c23e60bfd4fec24d1438|e-stats
290785 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.245.0|256|19930125|assigned|d6380a7662f572e9240353794c0b1f5e|e-stats
290786 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.246.0|256|19930125|assigned|8639bcc29508777c05bd241673461908|e-stats
290787 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.247.0|256|19930125|assigned|f1a97bc35f0ea9127934dc1c93c6ccc5|e-stats
290788 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.248.0|256|20130429|assigned|532539e84cbb18c691a50390db186131|e-stats
290789 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.249.0|256|19930125|assigned|9f14454567a6c23e60bfd4fec24d1438|e-stats
290790 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.250.0|256|19930125|assigned|cdc65c90124b367ce35ae08fc39316b4|e-stats
290791 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.251.0|256|20130422|assigned|96c6fb5ec0231b378d577be3538aa01f|e-stats
290792 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.252.0|256|19930125|assigned|a6ee0552fa98e1f95d685204654a5a8c|e-stats
290793 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.253.0|256|19930125|assigned|1f99771bc3e23e6097509a331544ab65|e-stats
290794 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.254.0|256|19930125|assigned|1f99771bc3e23e6097509a331544ab65|e-stats
290795 arin|US|ipv4|198.17.255.0|256|20130422|assigned|d542f963d47c7774cd04044e7a9978d8|e-stats
290796 iana|ZZ|ipv4|198.18.0.0|131072|19990301|reserved|ietf|iana
290797 arin|US|ipv4|198.20.0.0|2048|20120914|assigned|d2fc8fbc818f19b5b4e50576735f87e4|e-stats
290798 arin|CA|ipv4|198.20.8.0|2048|19921125|assigned|983f7167e66bbe5762aad527e385e27|e-stats

```

Example of reserved and available prefixes


Do it yourself

- Open source repo which contains:
 - Shell script implementing the methodology
 - Bird template configuration
 - Python script which extracts Bogons from RIPE RIS or RouteViews MRT dumps
 - README with detailed steps

URL: <https://github.com/codebgp/bogons>

Or get access to our Platform

- Go to <https://cloud.codebgp.com/> and in the Organisation ID type “bogons”
- Sign up
- Docs: <https://docs.codebgp.com/>




Code BGP Platform

bogons

Enter your organization ID

Go!



Code BGP Platform

Log In Sign Up

jamesmith@example.com


.....

James

Smith

Example Company

Sign Up



By using the bogons instance we can:

- Make sure we don't announce or propagate bogon prefixes
- Make sure we don't use or propagate bogon ASNs
- Figure out who does it and let them know so they fix their announcements and/or filters



Overview

Setup

Looking Glass

API

Integrations

Looking Glass [Info](#)

- Prefixes
- Autonomous Systems
- Peerings
- Routes**
- RPKI ROAs

Prefix	Origin AS	Neighbor AS	AS
> 190.123.9.0/24	278014	270814	34
> 190.123.8.0/24	278014	270814	34
> 190.123.8.0/23	278014	270814	34
> 2a07:e340::/32	65042	9009	5
> 190.123.9.0/24	278014	270814	88
> 190.123.8.0/24	278014	270814	88
> 190.123.8.0/23	278014	270814	88
> 2001:c10:ff02::/48	64588	397942	50
> 2a0c:3800:300::/48	204378	4200140000	20
> 95.180.251.0/24	65535	25467	34927 6762 5603 25467 65535

FILTERS [RESET](#)

Prefix

Origin AS

Neighbor AS

AS Path

Communities

RPKI Status

First Detected

Last Update

Apply Filters

Find ASNs

- Overview
- Setup
- Looking Glass
- API
- Integrations

Looking Glass [Info](#)

- Prefixes
- Autonomous Systems
- Peerings
- Routes**
- RPKI ROAs

Prefix	Origin AS	Neighbor AS	AS Path	Update
> 217.16.6.0/24	65651	65601	57695 48024 137409 65601 8218	Apr 24, 2023, 15:12:00
> 217.16.12.0/24	65651	65601	57695 48024 137409 65601 8218	Apr 24, 2023, 15:12:00
> 217.16.13.0/24	65651	65601	57695 48024 137409 65601 204818	Apr 24, 2023, 15:12:00
> 217.16.8.0/24	65651	65601	57695 137409 6461 8218	Apr 24, 2023, 15:11:51
> 217.16.9.0/24	65651	65601	57695 137409 6461 8218 204818	Apr 24, 2023, 15:11:51
> 217.16.15.0/24	65651	65601	57695 56630 20485 6762 6461 8218 204818 65601 65651	Apr 24, 2023, 15:11:46
> 217.16.7.0/24	65651	65601	57695 137409 6461 8218 204818 65601 65651	Apr 24, 2023, 15:11:54
> 217.16.2.0/24	65651	65601	57695 137409 6461 8218 204818 65601 65651	Invalid Apr 24, 2023, 15:11:50
> 217.16.13.0/24	65651	65601	57695 137409 6461 8218 204818 65601 65651	Invalid Apr 24, 2023, 15:11:50
> 217.16.6.0/24	65651	65601	57695 137409 6461 8218 204818 65601 65651	Invalid Apr 24, 2023, 15:11:50

AS 65651

Name Not found.

Country Not found.

Abuse contact Not found.

More Info

[RIPEstat](#)

[IRR Explorer](#)

Not found.

[Cloudflare Radar](#)

Why bogon?



Launchpad
Search and Explore



Saved
Saved Searches



Use Cases
ASN Use Cases

Atlas Check

Historical WHOIS

Geo Check

Registration Check

Reverse DNS Consistency

Routing Check

Routing Consistency

RPKI Check

Enter an IP address/prefix, ASN, country code or FQDN
65651

Relative

Absolute

Latest



Abuse Contact



Unknown to RIPE NCC

Allocation History



Records were found in IANA

Announced Prefixes



AS65651 has 0 prefixes

AS Name



AS65651

--MISSING--

AS Neighbours



Unique ASNs: 0

IPv4: 0 left 0 right 0 uncertain

IPv6: 0 left 0 right 0 uncertain

AS Path Length



AS65651 has a median average path length of 0

AS Prefix Count



AS65651 has 0 IPv4 Prefixes and 0 IPv6 Prefixes

Maxmind Geo Map



MaxMind can find NO LOCATION for 65651

RIPE Atlas Targets



Found 0 records for AS65651

BGP Update Activity



No data available.

RIPE Atlas Probe Deployment



Query only available for larger timeframes

RIR Registration



IANA



AS65552-AS131071 is reserved

RIPE Atlas Probes



Found 0 records for AS65651

RIR Stats Country



The location of AS65651 is UNKNOWN

Why bogon?



Overview



Setup



Looking Glass



API



Integrations

Looking Glass [Info](#)

- Prefixes**
- Autonomous Systems
- Peerings
- Routes
- RPKI ROAs

Network	Origin AS			
> 2805:f10:f12::/48	262182	Network	Origin AS	
> 2803:6606:4000::/48	28075			
> 2620:a0:e0::/48	11278	IP Version	Mask Length	
> 2805:f10:f13::/48	262182	All		
> 2800:5e00:ffff::/48	28007	Data Sources (#)	Data Sources (%)	
> 2c0f:f590::/32	36974	min	max	min
> 2801:1f:d800::/48	254455			max
> 2801:c4:38::/48	18734			100%
> 2803:6606:4000::/34	28075			100%
> 15.42.0/23	132839			100%

FILTERS [RESET](#)

Network

Origin AS

IP Version

All

Mask Length

Data Sources (#)

min max

Data Sources (%)

min max

Apply Filters

Find Prefixes

Next steps

- Conduct a measurement study for the bogon phenomenon that could result in a publication
 - Try to correlate bogon data with DDoS attacks, BGP hijacks and other security related events
- Seek funding to develop a methodology and automation that will periodically inform people about their misconfigured BGP filters
- Goal: Internet with less bogons

References

[1] Team Cymru "The Bogon Reference" <https://www.team-cymru.com/bogon-networks>

[2] NLNOG "BGP Filter Guide" <https://bgpfilterguide.nlnog.net/>

[3] Aftab Siddiqui "Routing Security Terms: Bogons, Vogons, and Martians"

<https://www.manrs.org/2021/01/routing-security-terms-bogons-vogons-and-martians/>

[4] IANA "IPv4 Special-Purpose Address Registry"

<https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml>

[5] IANA "Internet Protocol Version 6 Address Space"

<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-address-space/ipv6-address-space.xhtml>

[6] IANA "Autonomous System (AS) Numbers"

<https://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/as-numbers.xhtml>

Questions



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